《A Cooperative Species》电子书下载

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作者: Samuel Bowles / Herbert Gintis
出版社: Princeton University Press
副标题: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution
出版年: 2013-6
页数: 280
定价: USD 24.95
装帧: Paperback
ISBN: 9780691158167

内容简介  · · · · · ·

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin.

In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert G...




作者简介  · · · · · ·

Samuel Bowles heads the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute and teaches economics at the University of Siena.

Herbert Gintis holds faculty positions at the Santa Fe Institute, Central European University, and the University of Siena.




目录  · · · · · ·

Preface xi
Chapter 1: A Cooperative Species 1
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Altruism in Humans 8
2.1 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 9
2.2 Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas 10
2.3 Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions 13
· · · · · · ()
Preface xi
Chapter 1: A Cooperative Species 1
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Altruism in Humans 8
2.1 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 9
2.2 Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas 10
2.3 Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions 13
2.4 Preview 18
Chapter 3: Social Preferences 19
3.1 Strong Reciprocity Is Common 20
3.2 Free-Riders Undermine Cooperation 22
3.3 Altruistic Punishment Sustains Cooperation 24
3.4 Effective Punishment Depends on Legitimacy 26
3.5 Purely Symbolic Punishment Is Effective 29
3.6 People Punish Those Who Hurt Others 31
3.7 Social Preferences Are Not Irrational 32
3.8 Culture and InstitutionsMatter 33
3.9 Behavior Is Conditioned on Group Membership 35
3.10 People Enjoy Cooperating and Punishing Free-Riders 38
3.11 Social Preferences in Laboratory and Natural Settings 39
3.12 Competing Explanations 42
Chapter 4: The Sociobiology of Human Cooperation 46
4.1 Inclusive Fitness and Human Cooperation 48
4.2 Modeling Multi-level Selection 52
4.3 EquilibriumSelection 57
4.4 Reciprocal Altruism 59
4.5 Reciprocal Altruism in Large Groups 63
4.6 Reputation: Indirect Reciprocity 68
4.7 Altruism as a Signal of Quality 71
4.8 Positive Assortment 72
4.9 Mechanisms and Motives 75
Chapter 5: Cooperative Homo economicus 79
5.1 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics 80
5.2 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 83
5.3 The Folk Theorem with Private Information 86
5.4 Evolutionarily Irrelevant Equilibria 87
5.5 Social Norms and Correlated Equilibria 89
5.6 The Missing Choreographer 90
Chapter 6: Ancestral Human Society 93
6.1 Cosmopolitan Ancestors 95
6.2 Genetic Evidence 99
6.3 PrehistoricWarfare 102
6.4 The Foundations of Social Order 106
6.5 The Crucible of Cooperation 110
Chapter 7: The Coevolution of Institutions and Behaviors 111
7.1 Selective Extinction 115
7.2 Reproductive Leveling 117
7.3 Genetic Differentiation between Groups 120
7.4 Deme Extinction and the Evolution of Altruism 121
7.5 The Australian Laboratory 123
7.6 The Coevolution of Institutions and Altruism 124
7.7 Simulating Gene-Culture Coevolution 126
7.8 Levelers and Warriors 130
Chapter 8: Parochialism, Altruism, andWar 133
8.1 Parochial Altruism and War 135
8.2 The Emergence of Parochial Altruism and War 138
8.3 Simulated and Experimental Parochial Altruism 142
8.4 The Legacy of a Past "Red in Tooth and Claw" 146
Chapter 9: The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity 148
9.1 Coordinated Punishment 150
9.2 Altruistic Punishment in a Realistic Demography 156
9.3 The Emergence of Strong Reciprocity 159
9.4 Why Coordinated Punishment Succeeds 163
9.5 A Decentralized Social Order 164
Chapter 10: Socialization 167
10.1 Cultural Transmission 168
10.2 Socialization and the Survival of Fitness-Reducing Norms 171
10.3 Genes, Culture, and the Internalization of Norms 173
10.4 The Internalized Norm as Hitchhiker 176
10.5 The Gene-Culture Coevolution of a Fitness-Reducing Norm 179
10.6 How Can Internalized Norms Be Altruistic? 180
10.7 The Programmable Brain 183
11 Social Emotions 186
11.1 Reciprocity, Shame, and Punishment 188
11.2 The Evolution of Social Emotions 191
11.3 The "Great Captains of Our Lives" 192
12 Conclusion: Human Cooperation and Its Evolution 195
12.1 The Origins of Human Cooperation 196
12.2 The Future of Cooperation 199
Appendix 201
A1 Altruism Defined 201
A2 Agent-Based Models 202
A3 Game Theory 207
A4 Dynamical Systems 209
A5 The Replicator Dynamic 212
A6 Continuation Probability and Time Discount Factor 213
A7 Alternatives to the Standing Model 214 A8 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Public and Private Signals 215
A9 Student and Nonstudent Experimental Subjects 217
A10 The Price Equation 218
A11 Weak Multi-level Selection 222
A12 Cooperation and Punishment with Quorum Sensing 223
References 225
Subject Index 251
Author Index 255
· · · · · · ()

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